Introduction
Linguistic theorizing may yet profit from recent developments in the social sciences. With the formulation of truth-conditional semantics and Gricean implicature theory in the 1970s, a convenient division of labor between semantics and pragmatics was established that, despite numerous elaborations and criticisms, has proved remarkably resilient and enduring. Even the more recent theoretical developments have for the most part not fundamentally challenged the underlying methodological assumptions that associate semantics with conventions and rules, and pragmatics with intentions and strategies. This opposition closely mirrors the familiar social-scientific opposition between structure and agency. The latter, however, has nowadays largely been transcended with the emergence of a variety of approaches usually referred to as 'practice theory'. Below, I would like to argue for two general claims:
1. In linguistic theory, as in the social sciences, there is room for a notion of practice that is not logically posterior or methodologically secondary to either structure or agency, but, on the contrary, may be constitutive of both; 2. Moreover, linguistic practices need not be, or at least not entirely be, cooperative.
In sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, practice-oriented concepts have already acquired a respectable status as theoretically and empirically useful, but they have not yet gained currency in what is usually called theoretical or core linguistics. My claim here is that, notably, the fields of semantics and pragmatics may gain by a more systematic incorporation of a practice dimension. I hope to illustrate this (admittedly preliminary) general argument with a criticism of, in particular, Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics, and with examples from classical Greek tragedy, a speech genre which reflects a linguistic practice and metalinguistic awareness that differ significantly from what contemporary theorizing would lead us to expect.
Semantics-pragmatics as structure-agency
In the 1970s and 1980s, a classical, or ideal-typical, division of labor crystallized between semantics as the domain of rules, conventions and literal language (or of propositional or sentential meaning), and pragmatics as the domain of strategies, intentions, and individually conveyed speaker's meanings. This strict opposition has more recently met with criticism from various sides, but despite such more recent developments, the methodological assumptions underlying this division have not seriously been questioned. These are:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1989: 26) As known, this principle does not claim that language users are in fact always cooperative, but rather that -other things being equal -they interpret each other's utterances as if they were. Most modestly, this principle merely captures an allegedly neutral or normal way of speaking. Even in such terms, the presumption that there is such a thing as a stylistically or socially neutral form of conversation, which is then characterized in the decidedly non-neutral terms of cooperativeness, politeness, and equality among the participants, runs into trouble. In many Gricean-inspired approaches, however, an overarching principle of cooperation becomes something much more momentous: it is no longer seen as merely a guiding principle governing the interpretation of polite exchanges of information, but as something of a necessity of nature: in Relevance Theory, something closely resembling the Cooperative Principle is promoted to the quasi-naturalistic status of a general empirical principle of human cognition; and there have recently been calls to turn the Principle into a central notion for logical semantics, that is, into a logical or a priori principle (Groenendijk 1999) . Such moves mask the fact that this principle is by no means necessarily as universally present in communication as is often assumed. Clearly, the Cooperative Principle has proved a rich and successful tool in linguistic theorizing. Yet, there are various kinds of linguistic interaction that do not conform to it. In various kinds of conflictual, authoritarian, or impolite communication, such as police interrogations, street brawls, and the exchange of insults, the conversational participants obviously do not and cannot simply assume the other's cooperativeness, sincerity or respectability. Either the participants simply are not cooperating, or they have to be forced to cooperate with the threat of various sanctions. In so far as these cases are treated as involving a simple failure to live up to an otherwise ever-present and ever-assumed Cooperative Principle, they are automatically reduced to a theoretically secondary status as abnormal, imperfect forms of communication. It may be worthwhile, however, to look at the consequences of giving up the methodological assumption that communication is normally, or essentially, cooperative.
Towards a practice account: Linguistic habitus
In the social sciences, the apparently inevitable opposition between structure and agency has been broken in an interesting way with the emergence of so-called practice approaches to social action, a wide spectrum of approaches that take practices not only as transcending both macrosocial structure and individual conscious agency, but as (partly) constitutive of both (cf. Schatzki a.o. (eds.) 2001 for an overview). Such practice-based approaches emphasize that social action (including linguistic communication) is often not wholly intentional or goal-directed, but not wholly reducible to conventionalized rules or structures either. In the social sciences, the fruitfulness of this 'practice turn' has been widely, though not universally, acknowledged. In linguistic theory, however, the potential fruitfulness of a practice approach has not yet been realized. There are some early precursors (notably, of course, authors like Austin and Wittgenstein), but the more radical implications of a practice turn have not yet been gauged. Among these implications are the idea that langue is not strictly prior to or independent from parole; that speakers and their intentions (that is, as fully conscious, responsible, and autonomous actors) need constitute a kind of rock bottom in the explanation of utterances, and -perhaps most importantly -that linguistic communication need not be wholly cooperative. My central claim is methodological in character: I would like to argue for the descriptive and explanatory advantages a reorientation towards practice may bring; but obviously, I can no more here than scratch the surface of this vast topic. Specifically, a more practice-oriented approach to language and linguistic communication may profit from Bourdieu's influential notion of habitus, construed as the prime force that drives social action.2 According to Bourdieu, much of our everyday social actions is driven by our habitus, i.e., by a set of internalized and at most semi-conscious and semi-intentional dispositions to behave in certain ways rather than others. These dispositions typically reflect, but are by no means mechanically determined by, social or structural factors, such as age, gender, and social class. Nor can habitus be reduced, Bourdieu argues, either to conscious, intentional planning and decision making (i.e., 'agency') or to social or structural factors that are external to the individual actor's consciousness (i.e., 'structure'). For an example, consider Western European table manners. These require that one hold one's fork in one's left hand and one's knife in one's right hand, and that one hold them in one specific way rather than another. Holding one's fork in one's right hand or leaning with one's elbow on the table are frowned upon, although they may be more tolerated from young children. Moreover, table manners are clearly linked to social status: for example, in the Netherlands, mashing one's food (apparently practiced by some 50% of the population) is widely considered a vulgar, i.e., lower-class and uneducated, way of eating. Thus, table manners may be considered an example of habitus as expected ways of behaving; they are clearly not innate but acquired, but at the same time, they are mostly not conscious or deliberate forms of action. For the most part, people will automatically or unthinkingly eat, without any further social aims in mind. Yet, according to Bourdieu, habitus factors may play a role in the reproduction of social inequality. Thus, students of lower-class background may meet invisible obstructions to their upward social movement, when they do not command the expected eating habits of the educated classes. Some prominent authors in linguistic theory have noted the potential usefulness of linguistic habitus as generating a near-automatic, expected way of behavior. Thus, Searle (1995: 132) acknowledges that his own notion of the Background, which he considers, among others, to be constitutive of literal meaning, bears some resemblance to Bourdieu's concept of habitus; but he does not spell out the implications of this resemblance. Likewise, Levinson (2000: xiii, 386) has noted that the notion of a 'preferred interpretation', which is central to his theory of generalized conversational implicature, may bear some resemblance to that of habitus. The introduction of a linguistic correlate to the notion of habitus does not, however, simply amount to the addition of a level of 'preferred interpretation' in between wholly conventional semantic meaning and wholly intention-driven conversational implicature. It calls for a more radical revision of the very opposition between structure and agency, and of its linguistic homologues like convention and intention, competence and performance, langue and parole, and even synchrony and diachrony.3 A practice-oriented account along such lines would not only incorporate expected ways of behaving that are not wholly conscious or driven by intentions or strategic calculations, but also provide more room for conflict in communication. Most importantly perhaps, it would involve an explication of power relations in social action, and thus promises a methodological alternative to the near-ubiquitous picture of linguistic communication as a wholly cooperative exchange between wholly rational and autonomous agents. Like Grice's Cooperative Principle, habitus can be transgressed or violated without any sense of logical contradiction; but unlike the Cooperative Principle, habitus is not presumed to be socially neutral. Closer attention to linguistic habitus would notions of symbolic power as constituting the everyday social world through language use (1991: 170) and symbolic violence as, among other things, delegating local vernacular varieties of language to a subordinate and 'sub-standard' status (1991: 51-2). 3 Cf. the searching, and still somewhat hesitant, observations in Hanks (1993).
emphasize the semi-automatic and expected -but by no means neutral -ways of using specific varieties of language in specific settings; it would also emphasize that the apparently cooperative character of linguistic communication may serve as a mask, and indeed a precondition, for the reproduction of social inequality (cf. esp. Bourdieu 1991: ch. 1). Thus, a practice turn in linguistic theory might help in explicating the limitations of both methodological individualism and a social-contract view of language.
Greek tragedy and linguistic action
Precisely how a practice approach could materialize in linguistic theory is a question that goes far beyond the scope of this paper; here, I can do no more than hint at some of the descriptive and conceptual gains that a practice turn might yield. As a first step, I would like to illustrate these claims with some examples taken from Greek tragedy, which not only features prototypically conflictual kinds of communication, but also betrays a remarkably rich and complex metalinguistic awareness. Most significantly, tragic characters do not generically presume that their conversation partners are sincere, to the point, rational, or even worth listening to; that is, they neither follow nor even assume the Cooperative Principle. This is, of course, significantly at odds with the central tenet of Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics. Further, the protagonists' concern with matters of honor and the numerous curses and blessings that occur in tragedy betray an awareness that language may be partly constitutive of (social) realities.4 Moreover, these metalinguistic beliefs inform the way the participants use their own language, and interpret that of others. In other words, we may see the complex interaction between language structure and meanings, linguistic practices, and metalinguistic beliefs or ideologies (cf. Hanks 1996: 230-4).5 Finally, there are clear indications that utterances are driven by a socially instilled habitus rather than by fully conscious deliberation, and that speaker's intentions have little control over linguistic action. For simplicity's sake, I restrict myself to the plays of Sophocles, assuming they express more or less coherent views on the character and use of language. No sweeping conclusions about the ancient Greek worldview, or even about classical Athenian thought, are implied.6
a. Cooperation and conflict
The conflictual character of tragic communication poses challenges not only to the common view of polite linguistic behavior as characterized by e.g. Brown & Levinson (1987) , but also casts doubts on the very framework within which their theory is set up. Not only is the Gricean Cooperative Principle routinely violated or ignored; it is demonstrably not even presumed as guiding the interpretation of others' utterances.
Tragic protagonists repeatedly refuse to engage in conversation, and when they do, they often dispute their conversation partner's sincerity, respectability, and even good sense.7 Thus, in Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone and Theseus have to use all their persuasive abilities to secure Polyneices a conversation with his father Oedipus; Polyneices himself has to claim the special status of a suppliant and hence, special divine authorization to be listened to. And when he finally addresses his father, the latter at first simply refuses to answer:
(1) ti sigais; ph neson, pater, ti: m m'apostrapheis. (1271-2) Why are you silent? Say something, father; do not turn away from me.8
This refusal to listen resembles the refusal to speak, described by Grice (1989: 30) as 'opting out' of the Cooperative Principle, but it does not appear as merely the passing suspension of a principle otherwise tacitly adhered to. Moreover, when tragic characters do talk to each other, they explicitly doubt or contest their interlocutors' cooperativeness. In the Oedipus Tyrannus, king Oedipus openly accuses his brotherin-law Creon and the seer Teiresias of lying, and refuses to accept their utterances as cooperative and sincere. In the Antigone, the ruler Creon disputes the honesty of both the guard who watches over Polyneices's corpse, and of the prophet Teiresias who tells him of the divine displeasure at his actions. And in the Ajax, Agamemnon insults Ajax's stepbrother Teucer, whose mother is Trojan, by saying that he literally does not understand his words:
(2) sou gar legontos ouket' an mathoim' eg : t n barbarous gar gl ssan ouk epa . (1262-3) I could not understand you if you were the speaker, as I do not know the barbarian language.
(Teucer, of course, has been speaking classical Greek all along). There are numerous other examples of such non-cooperative dialogue in Sophocles. They suggest that cooperative, let alone polite, linguistic behavior cannot simply be taken for granted as an underlying or presumed norm of communication; hence, that uncooperative utterances cannot be treated as mere deviations from, or exploitations of, such a norm.
b. Habitus
There are numerous indications that tragic utterances are driven by something like a linguistic habitus, that is, by an expected way of speaking and acting that is differentiated according to age, gender, and social status, rather than by the conscious deliberation of an autonomous and rational speaker. One cannot speak here of any neutral or 'normal' form of conversation that is violated or exploited, but rather of a socially constituted and differentiated power to speak in specific ways, a power which moreover is always open to negotiation and challenge. In Oedipus at Colonus, the aged Oedipus tells his daughter Antigone: His words suggest that young females are not normally expected to speak up, let alone at length. Shortly afterwards, Antigone treats her father to a remarkably lengthy speech, which, significantly, she starts with the plea (4) pater, pithou moi, kei nea paraines (1180) Father, let yourself be persuaded by me, even if I am young who give advice She thus indicates that youngsters can by no means assume that their parents (or elderly people in general) will take their words seriously. Similar situations occur, often with more tragic results: in the Antigone, Creon refuses to heed the advice of his son Haemon not to let Polyneices's corpse lie unburied, refusing to be instructed by someone younger (726-7). In Trachiniae (1114ff.), Hyllus only with somedifficulty persuades his dying father Heracles to listen to him. And in the Electra, Clytaemnestra simply ignores her daughter Electra's reproaches about the killing of Agamemnon, instead just retorting with
(5) poias d' emoi dei pros ge t nde phrontidos, h tis toiauta t n tekousan hubrisen, kai tauta t likoutos; (612-4)
What kind of consideration should I have for her, who thus insulted her mother, and that at such a young age?
These refusals, I would like to emphasize, are not simply indicative of the parents' flawed character, but rather expressive of a normal and expected course of behavior on the part of the children. An indication of a habitus-driven language use that reflects the speaker's social position appears in Trachiniae, where Deianeira's suggests that (6) kax agan t n ara/muthoikal s piptousin . (61-2) Even words of lowly-born can fall out well.
Her words betray that speakers of a low social status are not expected to say anything of importance. And in Electra, the chorus (consisting of young girls from Argos), utter a cautiously hedged curse against Clytaemnestra for murdering Agamemnon:
(7) h s ho tade por n oloit' ei moi themis tad ' aud n. (126-7) May the doer perish, if it is fit for me to speak this word.
The conditional addition here implies that they do not automatically assume they have the right to challenge those in power. In short, tragic speakers appear to be driven by something like a habitus which often is implicitly assumed, but which can easily be violated or challenged. Moreover, the language such habitus produce cannot be seen as socially or conversationally neutral: it reflects existing asymmetries in power, social status, age, and gender, which may at all times be challenged as unjust or illegitimate.
c. The power of words Unsurprisingly, tragic characters betray no belief in language as a structured or systematic set of conventions: they speak of words and speaking, rather than of language. Words are typically opposed to actions: idle talk is recurrently opposed to true, noble deeds; but there is also a clear belief that words (or as we would say, utterances of words) may themselves count as actions that may change the world. Oedipus complains that a small word from his sons could have prevented him from being banished from his native city (Oedipus at Colonus, 443). That is, a single (performative) utterance from those in power may be decisive for someone's juridical and social status. Even mentioning the very name of an individual or action is seen as potentially having serious consequences. For fear of conjuring them up, many speakers avoid using the very name of the Erinyes or wrath goddesses; instead, they are often euphemistically referred to as the Eumenides ('Kindly Ones') or simply described as That is, he considers the very mention of his past a grave attack on his social persona. More in general, the numerous insults flying back and forth in tragic disputes are but so many assaults on, or challenges to, the opponent's honor and respectability. Clearly, words are seen as important weapons with which to attack, or protect, people's social respectability, face, or honor. This is an important point to keep in mind when looking at the speech act of the curse (and, to a lesser extent, the blessing) which occurs so frequently in tragedy. King Oedipus unwittingly curses himself when he announces the horrendous punishment for the then unknown murderer or murderers of his father Laius (236ff.); in doing so, he assigns to himself the lowliest position of someone worse than a common criminal. Later, at Colonus, he violently curses his sons Eteocles and Polyneices, thus preventing both from achieving victory in battle and acquiring the Theban throne, and restating, or reproducing, the divine doom that rests upon his house. Such cases should not, as is often done, be taken as expressing a primitive belief in the magical power of words to influence nature, that is, as indicating a confusion of the human or social, the natural and the divine or supernatural spheres. First, it is not quite correct to say that these spheres are not, or not yet, crystallized in tragic thought: it is more appropriate to say that part of the force of tragedy lies precisely in the problematization of, and the ambiguous status of, such apparently strict distinctions. Second, and most importantly, many tragic characters reflect a clear metalinguistic awareness of what Bourdieu (1991: 170) has called the 'social magic' of performative language, i.e., the fact that the mere utterance of words may bring about the social reality or fact they represent (cf. Searle 1995: 45) . That is, language is seen here as a weapon to change the world, rather than as a contract to regulate it. Curses and blessings are among the most potent ways of affecting someone's face, or honor. When capturing Oedipus at Colonus, Creon suggests that he does so in defence of his honor, and that he would not have resorted to force, had his honor not been challenged:
(10) kai taut' an ouk eprasson, ei m moi pikras aut i t'aras rato kai tom i genei. (951-2) I would not have done so, had he not called down bitter curses on me and my race.
His own action (which defies the Athenian laws), in turn, is felt to be an insult to the honor of the Athenians and their king Theseus. Words are especially dangerous weapons because they cannot easily be controlled by humans. Tragic protagonists do not specify whether the power of words lies in the words themselves, in the speakers uttering them, or in the divinities sanctioning them; indeed, tragedy systematically exploits the ambiguities between the different authorities involved in the use of language, and the lack of control that human agents have over their own and others' words. Thus, one important restriction on the autonomy, and hence on the responsibility, of the individual speaker, occurs when he utters his words in anger (thumos). This thumos is seen as a partly external force, which leaves a human being not in control of himself. Thus, in Oedipus at Colonus, the Athenian king Theseus observes: Not only is the claim that someone else's words are governed by anger a prime way of indicating that his remarks should not be taken seriously; Oedipus even claims that some of his own earlier words were driven by thumos and should not have been listened to, especially when he said he wanted to be banished from the Theban lands (Oedipus at Colonus, . The supreme irony here, of course, is the question of how many of his violent utterances in the play, notably his imprecations against Creon and Polyneices, are driven by anger rather than reason; and even the question of whether words uttered in anger may nonetheless be serious and effective. It would obviously go too far to see in the concept of thumos a precursor of habitus; but the implications of both, among others that language use need not be wholly driven or controlled by fully conscious and responsible speaker's agency, are intriguingly similar. Likewise, Athena punishes Ajax for claiming that he needs no divine assistance when attacking Troy (Ajax, . Even though his statement may well be factually true, the goddess takes it as a serious offence. In short, tragic speakers are not fully in control of their own utterances, and it may be not simply problematic but positively dangerous to claim full sovereignty over and responsibility for one's deeds and words.10
Conclusion
I hope that this all too brief discussion of some of the linguistic and metalinguistic aspects of Sophoclean tragedy has made it plausible that there are significant areas of linguistic communication that cannot simply be assumed to involve cooperative, consensual, and polite behavior. The tragic characters' language ideologies, or metalinguistic beliefs, show that they not only do not conform to the demands of Gricean pragmatics, but do not even assume that others will conform to them. Instead, they betray an awareness of the social efficacy and possibly conflictual character of language; likewise, the perceived relative independence of tragic speech from autonomous speaker's agency and capacity for challenge and conflict suggests the potential of a more practice-oriented account informed by a notion of linguistic habitus.
The methodological implications of this should be clear by now: first, a focus on practices problematizes the strict opposition between semantics as the domain of rules and conventions (or of literal, propositional meanings) and pragmatics as the domain of intentions and strategies (or of figurative, speaker's meanings); second, it exposes the limitations of an uncritical assumption of autonomous and rational agency and of methodological individualism; third, it questions the universal validity of the often assumed social contract view of language and the associated consensus view of communication; fourth, it calls for a more systematic attention to the articulation of various forms of power in language use; and finally, it calls attention to the interaction between language structure, linguistic practice, and metalinguistic beliefs. In these and other ways, a systematic account of linguistic practice carries the promise of descriptively enriching linguistic theory, and of integrating the social and the cognitive aspects of language use. 
